Geopolitics Oct 18, 2026 · 8 min read

Red Sea war widens as carriers head back to Suez

Egypt weighs troops for Saudi Arabia as Suez traffic returns. Egypt’s parliament resumes debate on Monday on sending troops to defend Saudi Arabia against the Houthis. The Houthis have blockaded the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to Saudi-flagged tankers, AFP reported. Our view: the Suez comeback is more fragile than carriers admit. Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd now run Asia–Europe services through the canal, with one more due to start on 27 October. Maersk made 67 canal transits in September, against eight a year earlier. Our call: Egypt approves this week, Gemini keeps sailing through November, and late returners such as Yang Ming wait until 2027.

Egypt debates troops for Saudi Arabia nine days before Gemini’s last Suez switch
Egypt is one vote away from sending troops to Saudi Arabia. On Sunday 18 October, its parliament postponed a vote on President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi’s request to authorise military support for the kingdom, Gulf News reported. Lawmakers said deliberations would continue on Monday. Earlier that day, MP Mostafa Bakry said Egypt’s National Defence Council had approved “sending troops to Saudi Arabia on a defensive mission”.
Nine days later, on 27 October, the Umm Qarn is due to leave Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia on the first Suez routing of the AE12 Asia–Mediterranean service. That service is run by Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd under their Gemini partnership, and it is the last of four Gemini services announced in mid-September to get a Suez start date.
Our view is simple. The country that owns the Suez Canal is about to become a party to a Red Sea war, just as the container lines come back to the canal. The two stories are being reported separately. Forwarders should read them together.

What is happening in the Red Sea

The fighting pits Yemen’s Houthi movement, which Iran backs, against Yemen’s Saudi-backed government and the Saudi-led coalition. AFP, as carried by CBS News, says the Houthis’ war with that government “reignited in July after four years of calm, triggering attacks on Saudi oil shipments.” According to Marine Insight, the Houthis announced a maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia on 20 July. A US maritime advisory, cited by DefenceWeb, describes it as a blockade on Saudi-affiliated shipping transiting the Bab el-Mandeb. That strait is the narrow channel between Yemen and the Horn of Africa that forms the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
On 17 October, AFP, as carried by CBS News, reported that the Houthis “have also blockaded the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to Saudi-flagged tankers.” HNGN reported on 18 October that the blockade “can be extended to Emirati shipping at will”.
Here is what has happened recently:

Early 17 October: the Saudi-led coalition said it had intercepted a ballistic missile launched towards Yanbu, a Saudi oil port on the Red Sea, plus two cruise missiles over the Red Sea and three drones, according to Gulf News.

17 October, around 10:30 UTC: a small boat carrying seven people fired on an LNG tanker about 140 nautical miles southeast of Al Mukalla, Yemen, Gulf News reported. The tanker’s security team fired two warning shots and the boat changed course.

17 October: the coalition said it struck “maritime smuggling operations feeding weapons into Hodeidah”, the main Houthi-held port, HNGN reported.

1 October: an unidentified projectile struck inside Yanbu port, causing a fire and briefly halting loading of a Liberian-flagged tanker, DefenceWeb reported. Loading resumed.

The Houthis also “captured strategic positions along the Red Sea” last month, CBS News reported.
All of this sits on top of the Gulf crisis. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards say the Strait of Hormuz is closed to all vessels, Gulf News reported, though US Central Command said 400 commercial vessels passed through in the week to 16 October. UKMTO, the UK Royal Navy’s shipping security office, has recorded 23 attacks on ships since the start of October, according to CBS News. With Hormuz contested, Yanbu matters more. DefenceWeb notes that Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline lets its crude reach the Red Sea without passing through Hormuz, and that a drone attack has already disrupted it.

Why Egypt matters to container shipping

Egypt earns hard currency from every ship that uses the canal. On 17 October Sisi said Egypt would defend Saudi Arabia “if requested”, but he was careful about the scope. “I’m not talking about fighting anyone or attacking anyone,” he said, according to Gulf News. “We are speaking only about defence.”
Our read: the wording is aimed at the Houthis as much as at Egyptian voters. Cairo wants to stand by Riyadh without giving the Houthis a reason to treat Egyptian interests, or canal traffic, as targets. Whether the Houthis accept that distinction is another matter. Once Egyptian troops are in Saudi Arabia, the canal’s owner is formally on one side of the war.
There is also an American angle. Asked on 17 October whether Riyadh should accept Israeli help against the Houthis, President Trump said: “Yeah, I do, sure. Israel has been very helpful to Saudi Arabia.” That was reported by Gulf News. Our view: any visible Israeli role in Saudi defence gives the Houthis another reason to widen the list of ships they call targets.

The Suez comeback is real, and it is new

This comes at a bad time for the canal’s recovery. On 20 September, Suez Canal Authority chairman Osama Rabie said 1,358 vessels transited the canal in August, up 27% year on year, Ahram Online reported. Revenue rose to $567.1 million from $326 million.
The container lines are a big part of that. Maersk’s canal transits reached 67 in September, against eight in September 2025, according to Ahram Online. CMA CGM said 60 of its vessels passed through in September.
On 14 September, Container News reported that Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd would move four Gemini services from the Cape of Good Hope back to the Red Sea. Hapag-Lloyd gave its reason as a “more efficient connection and shorter transport options”. Here is where they stand, according to Ahram Online:

AE11: first westbound Suez sailing 19 September

AE5: first westbound Suez sailing 21 September

ME2: first westbound Suez sailing 24 September, with its first eastbound Suez sailing from Tangier on 31 October

AE12: first Suez routing from 27 October, in both directions

AE15 and AE19 were already routed via Suez, in July and August

Others are still weighing it. COSCO has three more ships scheduled. Yang Ming is “seriously considering” a return. OOCL expects a trial transit in October, according to a shipping agent cited by Ahram Online.
The carriers have kept an exit door open. Hapag-Lloyd says each transit is subject to a security review under naval protection, and that the move “does not amount to a strategic return of its full network to the Red Sea,” Ahram Online reported.

The risk is mistaken identity

So far the Houthi target list is narrow: Saudi-flagged or Saudi-linked tankers, and possibly Emirati ships. Container ships calling at Jeddah, or carrying cargo for Saudi buyers, are not formally on it. But the test is loose. After the July announcement, maritime risk firm Ambrey warned: “It is likely that vessels could be targeted for mistaken identities.”
Insurers already treat the area as high risk. The Joint War Committee, the London market body whose listed areas guide war-risk pricing, moved its Red Sea line further north in July. Its secretary, Neil Roberts, said the change “reflects the recent escalation by the Houthis and their attacks on Saudi vessels in the Red Sea,” Marine Insight reported. A war-risk premium is extra insurance charged per voyage, set as a share of the ship’s value. According to insurance industry sources cited by Marine Insight, premiums for southern Red Sea voyages rose from about 0.3% before the embargo to between 1% and 2%. Calls at Saudi ports north of Jizan, including Jeddah and Yanbu, rose to about 1%. Marine Insight notes that even a small increase can add hundreds of thousands of dollars to a seven-day voyage.

What forwarders should do now

First, don’t promise Suez transit times on anything beyond the next few sailings. The routing is decided service by service and can flip with a single security review. Build a Cape fallback into Q1 quotes and say so in writing.
Second, check the routing on every Saudi Red Sea booking, at Jeddah, King Abdullah Port and Yanbu. Saudi-linked cargo is where war-risk costs and carrier caution will bite first. Expect emergency or war-risk surcharges on those calls before the main Asia–North Europe lanes see them.
Third, watch three triggers: Monday’s vote in Cairo, any attack on a non-Saudi merchant ship south of Jeddah, and any Houthi statement that names Egyptian or Emirati interests. Any one of them could change a carrier’s security review overnight.
For shippers on Asia–Mediterranean, the AE12 switch is good news on paper: shorter transits and less fuel. But it puts more boxes on a route that runs past an active war.

Our prediction

We expect Egypt’s parliament to approve the deployment within the week, framed as defensive. We think Gemini will keep AE12’s 27 October Suez start and keep its other Suez services running through the end of November, unless a container ship is hit. Carriers still deciding, such as Yang Ming and OOCL, will hold back and push full network returns into 2027. War-risk costs on Saudi Red Sea calls will rise further before year end, and forwarders will see that as new surcharges on Saudi-bound cargo within six weeks.

Sources