Friday, October 23, 2026
The news that moves freight
Trade & Customs Oct 23, 2026 · 7 min read

US Iran sanctions reach port agents, a law firm and dry cargo ships

Nine ships, two port agents and a law firm: Iran sanctions move past tankers. On 21 October the US Treasury blacklisted nine ships linked to Iran trade. Seven are Panama-flagged bulk and general cargo ships, not tankers. It also named a Singapore port agent, a Dubai shipping agent and a Greek-Panamanian law firm. Our view: the risk now sits with the service layer forwarders use every day. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said “we will find you and sanction you”. Re-screen agents, bunker suppliers and vessel IMO numbers on any breakbulk or charter booking. Our call: at least one more non-Iranian port agent or ship-services firm is named by 30 November.

Washington moves down the Iran supply chain, to the agents and bulk ships forwarders actually use

On 21 October 2026 the US Treasury put nine ships linked to Iran trade on its blacklist. Seven of them are Panama-flagged bulk and general cargo ships. Two more are UAE-flagged support vessels owned by a Dubai shipping agent. Alongside the ships, Treasury sanctioned a Singapore port agent, that Dubai agent, a law firm based in Panama and Greece, and five people linked to the firm.

All of it falls under “Operation Economic Outcast”. That is the name Washington gave its pressure campaign on Iran when it launched on 24 August.

What we think it means

Our view is simple. Iran sanctions are no longer only about tankers. For most of the past few years the headlines were about oil tankers in the “shadow fleet”, the ships that move sanctioned cargo under hidden or shifting ownership. This action goes after the services around those ships: the lawyers who set up the owning companies, the agents who handle port calls, and the firms that supply fuel.

That matters for forwarders because these are the same kinds of companies forwarders deal with every week. A port agent in Singapore or a shipping agent in Dubai is a normal counterparty. So is a ship manager running a handful of bulk carriers that will take steel, bagged cargo or project parts. The risk has moved from the edge of the business into its everyday supply chain.

Who was named and why

The detail comes from the Treasury press release.

The law firm is Karnakis and Karnakis. Treasury says it “has for years leveraged its legal practice to register shipping companies that own shadow fleet vessels”. It says the ships owned by those companies moved hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian steel, petroleum and petrochemicals. Treasury also says the firm set up, among others, three companies that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC, the Treasury unit that runs sanctions) had already designated: Skyros Maritime and Trading, Corfu Maritime and Trading, and Elias Shipping and Trading Group.

The release explains how the hiding worked. “Karnakis and Karnakis employees, including Panamanian national Roberto Ortega Jones, act as directors and officers of many of the companies they register in order to obfuscate the true beneficial owners of these companies.” In plain terms: the firm’s own staff sat on company boards so the real owners did not appear on paper.

The ship manager is Roxette Maritime Shipping and Trading, based in Panama and Greece. Treasury says Karnakis and Karnakis is its corporate agent. Roxette operates and manages seven Panama-flagged ships, which Treasury lists with their IMO numbers (the permanent ID each ship keeps even when its name changes): Anemos (9205952), Gloris (9449510), Pride (9487407), Destiny (9385491), Flamingo 1 (9474199), Harmony (9449522) and Prince (9548316). Treasury says three of them, Anemos, Gloris and Pride, carried Iranian-origin goods, including petrochemicals and steel, within the past year. Splash247 describes them as bulk and general cargo ships.

The Singapore firm is Amigoz Singapore, a port agency. Treasury says it acted as agent for a shipment of Iranian light crude oil overseen by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company. Splash247 reports that Amigoz also supplied bunkers (ship fuel) to the shadow fleet tanker Zixuan, and that Treasury tied it to networks linked to Iranian shipping figure Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani.

The Dubai firm is Whales Shipping Line. Treasury says it acted as shipping agent for Sparrow Trading FZE, which arranged purchases of Iranian petrochemicals. Treasury puts Whales’ business with Amigoz at “hundreds of thousands of dollars”. Its two ships, Whales Diamond (9375032) and Whales Pearl (9483114), were identified as blocked property.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent framed it this way: “Whether you are conducting illegal oil transfers at sea or sitting in the corner office of a law firm, if you are supporting the Iranian regime, we will find you and sanction you.” He added: “Iran’s facilitators must make a choice: Either you are with us or against us. We know who you are, we know what you’re doing, and we will continue to take action.”

Splash247 also reports that US authorities are investigating a Greek bank over possible Iran links. The bank was not named.

How the campaign got here

The groundwork was laid in August. On 24 August OFAC made new “sectoral determinations” under Executive Order 13902, the 2020 order that lets the US sanction people working in named parts of Iran’s economy. Shipping was one of five sectors added, alongside aviation, digital assets, gold and technology.

The insurers who cover shipowners saw what that meant straight away. The West of England P&I Club, writing on 28 August, warned that “non-U.S. persons, including those with no U.S. operational footprint, face potential designation”. It also said anyone who “provides services in support of” a covered sector could be named. The club noted that OFAC might later define where operating in Iranian shipping ends and giving incidental services to a ship with an Iranian link begins.

The Swedish Club, another marine insurer, told members on 4 September to re-screen “counterparties, vessels, managers, beneficial owners and payment chains” against the SDN list, the US list of blocked people and firms. It said to include the 50 percent rule, under which any company owned 50 percent or more by blocked parties is itself blocked. And it told members to expect tougher due diligence questions from “insurers, brokers, banks and bunker suppliers”.

The 21 October action shows that warning being carried out. A port agent and a fuel supplier are exactly the “services in support” the clubs flagged. Treasury had already issued two Operation Economic Outcast releases on 15 October, one on Iran’s financial networks and one on charity networks. Three releases in one week shows the pace.

Treasury is also claiming results. Gulf News reports that on 22 October Bessent posted a video saying there were no crude tankers at Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export terminal. That is his claim and we cannot check it. But it tells you Washington thinks the approach is working, and campaigns that look like they are working tend to grow.

What forwarders should do now

The legal exposure is real even if you never touch Iranian cargo. Treasury’s release says that foreign banks dealing with the named parties “may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions”. Secondary sanctions are US penalties aimed at non-US companies. Any bank that fears them will slow down or freeze payments that look close to the line. That includes payments to agents in Dubai and Singapore.

In our view, five practical steps follow.

First, screen by IMO number, not by ship name. Shadow fleet ships change names and flags often. The IMO number does not change. Check the nine numbers above against any fixture or booking.

Second, ask your agents who they use. If you hand port work to a sub-agent in the Gulf or Singapore, ask for its own agents and bunker suppliers. Amigoz was named for acting as an agent and selling fuel, not for owning cargo.

Third, look hard at small, opaque ship managers in breakbulk and project cargo. A manager with a few bulk ships, Panama flags and owning companies set up by the same law firm fits the pattern Treasury just described. Ask who the beneficial owner is, and keep the answer on file.

Fourth, check your contracts. Make sure your charter and booking terms let you refuse or stop a voyage if a ship, owner or agent is sanctioned mid-contract, and say who carries the cost.

Fifth, expect slower money. If your bank sees a Dubai or Singapore agent on a Middle East or Asia payment, plan for extra questions and build a few days’ slack into payment terms.

For shippers, the cost will mostly show up as friction rather than in freight rates. Fewer agents willing to take marginal business, more paperwork, and slower payments in Gulf and Southeast Asian trades. Low-cost, no-questions tonnage for steel and petrochemical moves will get harder to find, and that is the point of the policy.

Our prediction

Our call is that the campaign will keep moving down this chain. By 30 November 2026, we expect Treasury to name at least one more port agent, bunker supplier or ship-services company based outside Iran under Operation Economic Outcast. The pace of releases in October, the August sector determinations and Bessent’s own words all point that way. If it happens, the forwarders who have already re-screened their agents and vessel lists will barely notice. The ones who have not will find out from their bank.

Sources