Graham Act tariffs signed and switched off in the same order

A 100% tariff on Russian-oil buyers now exists in law, and is switched off. Here is what that means for your India and China lanes On 16 October the White House published an executive order titled “Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026”. It does three big things on tariffs. It raises the duty on goods from Russia by 500%. It adds 100% on goods from the five largest importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, if they keep buying on or after 18 October 2026. And it adds another 100% on goods from the top five countries that help Russia dodge oil sanctions.
Then, a few paragraphs later, the same order waives all of those duties.
Our view is simple. For now, nothing changes at the US border. No new duty is due on an Indian or Chinese shipment arriving next week because of this order. But something has changed. A 100% tariff on some of the biggest sourcing countries in the world now sits in law, already written, waiting for one decision to switch it on. We think the White House will keep it switched off and use it as a bargaining chip. Forwarders should still plan for the day it is not.

What the order actually says

The Graham Act itself was signed on 18 September 2026, according to the order. TFTC reports that it passed the Senate 86-11 and the House 262-159. The executive order published on 16 October is how the President puts it to work.
Section 2(a) is blunt: “The rate of duty on goods from the Russian Federation shall be increased by 500 percent ad valorem”. Ad valorem means a percentage of the goods’ value.
Section 2(b) is the part that matters most for forwarders. It applies 100% ad valorem to goods from the top five importers of Russian crude and gas “if the country knowingly makes new purchases of crude oil or natural gas” on or after 18 October 2026.
Section 2(c) adds 100% on the top five facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion. The US Trade Representative (USTR), working with other officials, is to identify them. The order does not name any country.
Section 2(d) says these increases stack on top of other duties. That includes anti-dumping and countervailing duties (extra duties on goods sold below fair value or subsidised abroad) and duties under Sections 122, 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
Then comes Section 4(a): “Pursuant to section 115(a) of the Graham Act, I hereby waive the application of any duties provided for in sections 112…” That sentence goes on to cover the duties in sections 112 and 113 of the Act and in the order itself. Other parts of Section 4 waive a long list of the Act’s other sanctions provisions too.
Section 4(d) sets how long this lasts. The waivers “remain in effect until such time as the President or the Secretary of State” decides further action is appropriate, consulting the Treasury Secretary and USTR as needed.
Section 3 asks USTR, with the State, Treasury and Energy secretaries, to monitor who is buying Russian oil and gas. USTR must report regularly and alert the President promptly to anything that might call for further action, including changes to the waivers.

What is missing, and why that matters

Three things a customs broker would look for are absent. The order does not mention CBP (US Customs and Border Protection). It does not change the HTSUS, the US tariff schedule that tells brokers which duty to apply. And it gives no effective date for the rate increases. The 18 October date only marks when new oil purchases start to count.
That means there is no mechanism yet to collect these duties, even if the waiver were lifted tomorrow. In practice, CBP would need to issue guidance and new tariff lines first. That usually gives the trade some notice. It does not guarantee much.
TFTC’s newsroom summed it up: “The tariff machinery is real. So is the escape hatch.” It argued the waivers make the order look more like a negotiating position than hard enforcement.
There is also a near-term date for banks. TFTC reports that the Act requires action against Sberbank, VTB and Gazprombank by 19 October. It says it is not yet clear whether those sanctions fall inside or outside the Section 4 waiver. Forwarders handling Russia-linked payments should watch for Treasury guidance.

Who could be hit

The order names no countries for the 100% tier. But the buyers are well known. A Steptoe analysis published on 20 August, while the bill was still in Congress, described China as the largest importer of Russian fuels, and China and India as the two largest. It also noted that Hungary and Slovakia take large volumes of Russian pipeline gas, and that the bill had carve-outs that could cover some gas buyers.
India’s numbers are large and moving. IndraStra, citing Kpler ship-tracking data, reported that India’s Russian oil imports hit a record 2.82 million barrels a day in July 2026, or 55.9% of its crude intake. They fell to 2.08 million barrels a day in August and were running at about 1.8 million in September. Other trackers give different figures, so treat the trend more than the decimals.
Steptoe’s view was that enforcement would likely be case by case, driven by each bilateral relationship, with tariffs used mainly as leverage. It saw India as the most likely target. It saw pressure on China as less likely because of the fragile trade truce. It also pointed out one detail that matters here: unlike some older sanctions laws, this bill does not force waivers to be renewed every 180 days. So the waiver can sit quietly for a long time, or be pulled on any day.

We have seen this film before

This is not the first time Washington has used tariffs over Russian oil. IndraStra reports that in August 2025 a US executive order added a 25% duty on Indian goods over Russian crude, on top of the reciprocal tariff. Washington lifted that penalty in February 2026, after Trump said India had committed to stop buying Russian oil. New Delhi did not publicly confirm a halt.
Steptoe read that episode as a sign that tariffs alone may not change India’s buying. Indian imports of Russian crude did not stop; IndraStra’s July record came months after the penalty was lifted.
Two other details from IndraStra matter. First, Indian goods currently face a 10% US tariff, imposed on grounds unrelated to Russian oil. Second, it reports that the US Supreme Court ruled the emergency powers law does not authorise tariffs. That took away the legal basis for the earlier reciprocal tariffs.
That is our main point. The Graham Act is a tariff power written by Congress, not borrowed from emergency law. We think it is harder to challenge in court. The White House has chosen not to use it yet. But it now has a sturdier tool than it had in 2025.
Talks are live too. IndraStra reported that India’s commerce minister Piyush Goyal was due to meet US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on 30 September and 1 October, and that Secretary of State Marco Rubio plans to visit India in October. A switched-off 100% tariff is useful leverage during those talks. We think that is the point of the waiver.

What forwarders should do now

First, answer clients clearly. The duty is not live. Section 4 of the order waives it. No CBP guidance exists. Do not quote a 100% surcharge into landed costs today.
Second, keep a scenario. If you handle India or China sourcing into the US, build a landed-cost model with an extra 100% on top of current duties. Under Section 2(d) it would stack on Section 232, Section 301 and anti-dumping duties, not replace them. On some goods the total would make the trade unviable overnight.
Third, check contracts. Who pays a new duty that lands while goods are on the water? DDP terms (delivered duty paid, where the seller pays import duties) put that risk on the supplier. Many shippers have not reread those clauses since 2025.
Fourth, watch three signals. A USTR report naming the top five buyers or facilitators. Any CBP message on Graham Act duties or new tariff lines. And the outcome of the US-India trade talks. If talks stall, the waiver is the obvious pressure point.
Fifth, expect sourcing questions. Shippers who moved orders from China to India to dodge earlier tariffs may now ask whether India is any safer. Our honest answer is that the risk is political and could change with little notice.

Our call

We expect the Section 4 waiver to stay in place through the end of 2026. Our specific prediction: no Graham Act duty, at 500% or 100%, is collected at a US port before 31 December 2026, and CBP issues no implementing guidance before then. If the waiver is lifted for any country during that period, we expect India to be first, and only after the US-India trade talks visibly break down.

Sources

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• The White House — Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, 16 Oct 2026 \
• TFTC — Trump EO Activates 500% Russia Tariffs While Waiving Its Own Sanctions, 17 Oct 2026 \
• Steptoe — The Lindsey O. Graham Russia Sanctions Act of 2026: Outlook for Markets and US Trade Policy, 20 Aug 2026 \
• IndraStra — New U.S. Law Revives Tariff Threat Over India’s Russian Oil as Trade Talks Continue, 28 Sep 2026