The news that moves freight
Geopolitics Nov 6, 2026 · 8 min read

Houthis aim at Saudi targets while Bab al-Mandab traffic creeps back

Tracker Red Sea and Hormuz: are ships going through? · 36 ships/day

The Red Sea is reopening on Houthi terms, and Yanbu shows how fast that can change

About 34 commercial ships a day passed through Bab al-Mandab, the narrow strait between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, from 1 to 4 November. That is from tracking data reported by Gulf News, which gives daily counts of 38, 37, 35 and 26. The week before averaged about 28 a day. Gulf News says traffic “remains below the levels recorded before the Houthi ‘selective embargo’ announced on July 20.”

On 5 November, the same week the traffic rose, Saudi civil defence issued a danger warning for Yanbu. Yanbu is a key Saudi Red Sea oil port and the end point of the pipeline the kingdom uses to export crude without going through the Strait of Hormuz. Minutes later, the Saudi-led coalition said it had shot down a Houthi ballistic missile aimed at the Medina region. A day earlier, the Houthis said they had hit Riyadh’s main airport.

In our view, these are two sides of one story. Ships are returning to the Red Sea because the Houthis are aiming at Saudi Arabia, not at merchant ships. That is a choice the Houthis made, and they can reverse it. Forwarders should treat the Suez recovery as something that can be taken back, and keep their contracts flexible.

What happened this week

On Wednesday 4 November, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said a ballistic missile had “directly hit” King Khalid International Airport (KKIA) in Riyadh and caused “significant damage,” according to House of Saud. Xinhua carried the same claim from Sanaa. Saudi Arabia has not confirmed the hit, and neither outlet independently verified it. Saree also told airlines, airport staff and travellers to stay out of Saudi airspace, except over Mecca and Medina.

On Thursday 5 November, Saudi civil defence warned of “potential danger” near Yanbu, Dawn reported, citing AFP. House of Saud, citing Ajel English, puts the all-clear at 09:52 UTC. Coalition spokesman Turki al-Malki then posted on X: “Air defence intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched by the terrorist Houthi militia toward the Madina region.” Dawn notes: “It was unclear if the two events were connected.”

The Houthis denied aiming at Medina. Saree called the claim “a blatant and grave falsehood.” He also said: “Our operations target only its oil facilities and military bases,” according to AFP as relayed by House of Saud.

That denial matters. It tells us which targets the Houthis are choosing. Oil facilities on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast are on their list. So are airports, as the KKIA campaign shows. Commercial shipping, for now, is not.

Why Yanbu matters to the whole route

Yanbu is where the East-West Pipeline reaches the Red Sea. House of Saud, citing Saudi Gazette, puts the pipeline’s design capacity at 7 million barrels a day. Dawn describes Yanbu and the pipeline as key since the start of the Middle East war, because they let Saudi oil get around the blockaded Strait of Hormuz.

The cost of that route is already rising. War-risk premiums for tankers loading at Yanbu have tripled to about 3% of a ship’s value, House of Saud reports, citing Reuters via AGBI. A war-risk premium is the extra insurance a shipowner pays to enter a conflict zone. Kpler data cited in the same piece puts Saudi oil exports at about 5.52 million barrels a day in October.

For container shipping, the point is location. Yanbu is on the same sea that Asia–Europe box ships use to reach Suez. A missile alert there moves the Houthi campaign from Riyadh, far inland, to the Red Sea coast. We think insurers will look at the sea area, not the Houthis’ stated target list. If Yanbu-loading tankers cost more to insure, ships passing nearby will face questions too.

Air cargo into Riyadh is already squeezed

The KKIA campaign is hurting air freight now. House of Saud, citing Cirium flight data, reports that “86 percent of scheduled flights have been cancelled since October 8 — 4,071 out of 4,736.” It says the attacks have killed at least 21 people.

Most air cargo into Riyadh travels as bellyhold, in the cargo hold of passenger planes. When passenger flights stop, that space goes too. Etihad has cancelled KKIA services through 19 November and KLM through 27 November, House of Saud reports. Two NOTAMs (notices to airmen, the official alerts pilots must follow) are in force. One requires approval from GACA, Saudi Arabia’s aviation authority, for all arrivals and departures at KKIA. The other bars KKIA as a diversion airport.

For shippers with freight bound for central Saudi Arabia, this means fewer flights, less space and higher rates on what is left. The practical workaround is to fly into another Saudi gateway and truck the last leg. That costs more and takes longer, and quotes should say so.

The ships are coming back, slowly

The container lines have been testing a return for weeks. In a piece republished by gCaptain on 1 October, The Loadstar reported that Linerlytica counted 140 boxships making a “structural switch” from Cape of Good Hope routings to Suez since May, roughly 2 million TEU of capacity. A TEU is a twenty-foot equivalent unit, the standard container measure. ONE’s 8,100-TEU One Continuity, on the Premier Alliance’s FE1 Asia–North Europe service, was scheduled to reach the Suez Canal on 9 November and Rotterdam on 19 November.

The big forwarders expect more to follow, but not quickly. On 22 October, Reuters (via Baird Maritime) reported that Kuehne+Nagel chief executive Stefan Paul expects most container lines to go back to Suez in late Q1 or early Q2 2027. “There is a clear intention among carrier partners to return to the route,” he said. He also said geopolitics remains volatile.

The security reports are reassuring, with caveats. The Joint Maritime Information Centre (JMIC) issued its Update 111 advisory on 5 November, distributed by UKMTO, the UK Maritime Trade Operations centre. Gulf News says it recorded one suspicious-activity incident and no confirmed attack on a merchant vessel. Gulf News also writes: “The waterway remains open to commercial shipping.” It adds the warning that “operational does not mean safe.”

Iran is openly linking the strait to the wider war. IRGC Quds Force chief Esmaeil Ghaani, in an interview with Sepahnews reported by IRNA and ANI on 5 November, warned that the US could face “the opening of the Bab el-Mandeb through Resistance” and that “you will end up fighting a war with weapons in the Strait of Hormuz.” He added: “today the entire Resistance is one front with unity across different arenas.” In plain terms, Tehran is saying the Red Sea calm depends on how the US–Iran conflict goes.

What happened last time

Shipping has seen a false start like this before. On 24 December 2023, Maersk said it would resume sailing through the Red Sea. On 30 December, a missile hit the Maersk Hangzhou about 55 nautical miles southwest of Al Hodeidah, Yemen. Early on 31 December, four small boats attacked the same ship. US Navy helicopters returned fire, and three of the boats were sunk. Maersk then halted all Red Sea transits for 48 hours, according to Reuters via gCaptain.

The return lasted about a week. The lesson for forwarders is that schedules built on a Suez routing can unwind within days, and customers who bought “Suez” transit times will want to know who pays when the ship turns back to the Cape.

What forwarders should do now

First, don’t build Suez transit times into fixed-price, fixed-schedule deals for Q1 2027 without a way out. Ask carriers what their contracts say about switching back to the Cape, and pass the same terms on to shippers. A switch back to the Cape adds sailing days and inventory costs, and someone has to carry them.

Second, watch Yanbu, not just Bab al-Mandab. A confirmed strike on Saudi Red Sea oil infrastructure would push war-risk premiums higher across the area, and box carriers would face the same insurance maths as tankers.

Third, for Saudi air freight, quote central Saudi Arabia as a constrained market until at least the end of November, when the KLM suspension runs out. Offer alternative gateways and road legs up front instead of waiting for space to disappear.

Fourth, keep the one-week rule from 2023 in mind. If a merchant ship is hit in the southern Red Sea, expect carrier advisories within 24 to 48 hours and plan bookings on that basis.

Our call

We expect Bab al-Mandab transits to stay below their pre-20 July level through 30 November, even if the daily count holds in the 30s. We also expect no top-five container line to move its full Asia–North Europe network back to Suez before 31 December 2026. Returns will stay at the level of single services and single sailings, like FE1. The reason is simple: the Houthis have widened their targets to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, and Iran is tying the strait to a war that has not ended. Carriers will not commit whole networks to a route that one speech in Sanaa or Tehran can close.

Sources

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