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Geopolitics Nov 7, 2026 · 7 min read

Ships ask the Houthis for Red Sea permits by email

Tracker Red Sea and Hormuz: are ships going through? · 36 ships/day

One-week permits by email: the Houthis are licensing the Red Sea route back into use

Ships that want to cross Bab al-Mandab are emailing the Houthis first. The group usually answers within 24 hours. Sometimes the answer is a permit with conditions and an end date. The Wall Street Journal reported this on Friday 6 November, as relayed by the Jerusalem Post.

The headline under that story is simple. The traffic coming back to the Red Sea is not coming back to an open sea. In our view, a growing share of it is moving under a licence issued by the Houthis, one ship and one week at a time. That licence can be withdrawn without notice. Anyone booking cargo on the Suez route should price it that way.

How the permit system works

The emails go to the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center, or HOCC. The Houthis set it up in early 2024, according to the Jerusalem Post’s account of the WSJ report. In the emails, ships share their expected schedules. They state that they have no ties to Israel, the US or the UK. They also commit to the international collision regulations.

The Houthis have long said that ships not linked to the US, UK or Israel may pass. The WSJ report says shippers began asking for written assurances after the Houthis declared a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia in July.

One reply shows what the system looks like in practice. The Chinese containership Zhong Cheng Chang Ling was issued “a one-week permit”, the Jerusalem Post reported. The Houthis told it to keep its AIS switched on during transit. AIS is the Automatic Identification System, the transponder that broadcasts a ship’s position. It also had to keep VHF Channel 16, the international distress and calling channel, open. The email invited the crew to call a HOCC hotline and sign up for its alerts.

The ship’s captain told the WSJ that “the ship management told him to contact the Houthis as an extra precaution”, in the Jerusalem Post’s words.

None of this is a toll. Nobody has reported money changing hands. But it is a filter, and the Houthis run it. They see a ship’s schedule before it arrives. They decide whether it fits their rules. They set how long the answer lasts. A one-week permit is a short leash.

Why the official advice says don’t

Official maritime guidance says vessels “should not engage or register with the HOCC”, the Jerusalem Post reported, and it says many ships do not.

The warning is not new. In August 2025, the Yemeni Maritime Affairs Authority in Aden put out an advisory, published by the agency network GAC. It listed Houthi demands including “48-hour pre-notification, Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions”. It urged ships “not to comply with Houthi militia demands”. It also said: “The HOCC is not internationally recognised, and contact may create sanction, legal, and security risks.”

The advisory told ships to register their voyages with UKMTO, the UK Maritime Trade Operations centre, and with MSCIO, the Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean. It also told them to follow flag state and P&I guidance. P&I clubs are the mutual insurers that cover shipowners’ liabilities.

So carriers face a choice with no clean answer. A ship that stays silent follows the official advice but takes more security risk. A ship that emails the HOCC may lower its security risk but take on legal and sanctions exposure. Our view is that a quiet, uneven split between the two is already happening. Cargo owners mostly cannot see which side their box is on.

Saudi Arabia is now the front line

The permit story lands in the middle of a Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia that has moved inland and into the air.

On 6 November, the Saudi-led coalition said its air defences intercepted and destroyed two Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Najran, a major city in the south-west. “Debris fell as a result of the interception, and damage assessment is underway,” the coalition said, according to CBS News.

A day earlier, on 5 November, coalition spokesman Turki al-Malki said “Air defense intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched by the terrorist Houthi militia” towards the Medina region. Later that day Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree posted on X: “We targeted King Fahd International Airport in Dammam using a drone and our operation caused a disruption of air navigation”. CBS noted that a Houthi strike on the same airport on 22 October killed two people.

On 4 November, the Houthis also claimed a ballistic missile hit King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. Saree urged airlines not to travel through Saudi airspace. CBS said Saudi authorities did not immediately comment.

These claims are partly propaganda, and not every one has been verified. But the targets matter for freight. Dammam serves Saudi Arabia’s Gulf coast. Riyadh is the country’s main air gateway. Strikes on airports affect air cargo and belly capacity as well as ships.

What happened last time carriers came back

The Red Sea has teased a return before. In January 2026, Maersk said its MECL service would resume Suez transits. A month later Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd said their ME11 service would too. By early March both carriers had gone back to the Cape of Good Hope. That timeline comes from a Lloyd’s List report republished by Kuehne+Nagel on 10 July.

The same report showed how far traffic had to climb. Lloyd’s List Intelligence counted 229 containership transits of Bab al-Mandab in June 2026. In October 2023, before the attacks began, it counted 545. Transits by containerships above 10,000 teu (twenty-foot equivalent units, the standard box measure) rose to 126 in the first half of 2026, from 40 a year earlier. But the report said most carriers remained cautious about committing their largest ships. When Maersk restored MECL in July, it called the move “a further step towards a gradual return to the trans-Suez corridor.”

By September the return had spread unevenly across lanes. FreightWaves, citing Sea-Intelligence, reported on 15 September that more than a quarter of Asia–Europe capacity would transit the Red Sea that month. On Asia–Mediterranean, about 35% of headhaul capacity (the busier, loaded direction) and 50% to 60% of backhaul capacity was expected to go via Suez. On Asia–North Europe, only about 6% of headhaul and 30% of backhaul had returned. The same report cited a Freightos note saying the Houthis had seized a strategic port and island on the strait.

Our reading: the return has been led by smaller services, backhaul legs and the Mediterranean, where the time saved is largest and the risk is easiest to spread. The biggest Asia–North Europe loops have stayed mostly on the Cape. A permit system with weekly expiry dates gives the big alliances no reason to change that.

What forwarders should do now

First, ask your carriers a direct question. Do your ships on this service contact the HOCC before transit? The answer affects your sanctions screening, your customers’ compliance policies and, possibly, your cargo insurance. Get it in writing.

Second, read the deviation and war-risk clauses in your contracts and bills of lading. If a carrier switches a sailing from Suez to the Cape mid-voyage, you need to know who pays for the extra days and any added war-risk premium.

Third, keep two transit times on file for every Asia–Europe and Asia–Mediterranean booking. On MECL, Maersk put the Suez saving at about 7 days westbound and 14 days eastbound. That is the gap that can open overnight if a permit lapses or an attack resumes. Shippers with tight inventory plans should keep buffer stock sized for the Cape.

Fourth, watch Saudi gateways. If drone and missile claims against Dammam and Riyadh airports keep coming, expect airlines to trim Saudi routings and air cargo rates into the kingdom to firm up. Ocean cargo for Saudi Arabia should be checked against the Houthi blockade the group declared in July.

Finally, treat a rise in Red Sea transits with care. In our view, more ships passing does not mean the risk has gone. It may only mean more operators have quietly asked for permission.

Our call

Our prediction: we expect Bab al-Mandab transits to stay below their pre-20 July level through 30 November, even if the daily count holds in the 30s. We also expect no top-five container line to move its full Asia–North Europe network back to Suez before 31 December 2026. Returns will stay at the level of single services and single sailings. The permit system makes that more likely, not less. A network that sails on one-week permits is a network that can be switched off with one email.

Sources

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